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Defense policy has two fronts to deal with: one for external threats and the other for its 
domestic foundations. Traditionally, defense policy has been developed to protect the United 
States from the threats from the outside and this part of defense policy is controlled by the 
executive branch. However, its institutional and organizational foundations are based on its 
citizens, industries and economy. This part of defense policy has been influenced by Congress, 
the representatives of citizens. Specifically, the defense budget is a key area that can be 
controlled by Congress.  
 
In this thesis, I analyzed the Congressional influence on defense policy using three 
factors such as party unity, accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology, and cost of 
amendment. I attempt to consider an amendment as the unit of the analysis and examine the 
effect of the factors on passage of amendment. I also compare the authorization process and the 
appropriation process. As the result of the analysis, I find that the authorization process is quite 
different from the appropriation process even though these two processes are dealing with the 
same subject – defense budget. The authorization process is more policy oriented while the 
appropriation process is more budget related. Amendments in authorization bills are more 
predictable than those in appropriation bills. In the authorization process, majority party unity 
and accuracy of vote prediction by ideology have positive effects on passage of amendment, and 
cost of amendment has negative effect on it. In appropriations, all three factors do not show 
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"We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure 
domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of 
liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." 
- U.S. Constitution. 
1. Double fronts of Defense Policy 
Defense policy has two fronts to deal with; it primarily functions to deal with foreign 
threats, but in order to function well, it should be supported by the public and needs to be based 
upon domestic foundations such as popular support and economic capabilities (Huntington, 1961; 
Janowitz, 1974; Hays et.al., 1997).  
The preamble of the U.S. Constitution spells out six purposes and goals that the United 
States of America should pursue as a nation. Common defense is one of them, which means to 
secure “the American people as a whole” from threats (Huntington, 1961). Considering the fact 
that there are other goals that primarily concern domestic issues such as a “more perfect union, 
justice, domestic tranquility, general welfare, liberty and posterity”, it can be concluded that the 
threats that are dealt by providing common defense should come from not inside of the U.S. but 
outside of the U.S.  
In order to provide common defense against the external threats, the U.S. government 
searches for the source of threats, develops the strategies to deal with these threats and uses its 
military forces to execute these strategies (Kaufman et.al., 1985; Hays et.al., 1997) . These tasks 
are purely the jobs of professional soldiers and they are responsible for developing their own 




soldiers do not need to negotiate with their principals while dealing with external threats 
1
. The 
only thing they need is the logic that can persuade their principals such as citizens, the President, 
and members of Congress (Huntington, 1961; Sarkesian, 1999). This is the core of military 
professionalism.     
Nonetheless, when it comes to building up the foundation of defense policy, the story is 
quite different from dealing with foreign threats (Kaufman et.al., 1985; Ripley et.al., 1992; Hays 
et.al., 1997; Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). The foundation of defense policy comes from inside 
of the United States. First of all, most of the military organizations consist of U.S. citizens. 
Second, the defense budget that operates the military comes from the federal budget that is paid 
by the citizens. Third, most weapons that the military uses are made in the U.S and U.S. 
industries. Last, the agency that is responsible for defense policy is overseen and controlled by 
the representatives of the U.S. public – the U.S. Congress. Building up the foundations of 
defense policy are purely political tasks that require promoting public support; making contracts 
with industries; and mostly persuading the Congress and the President (Ripley et.al., 1988; 1992). 
These are the core tasks of civil-military relations.   
 Consequently, in order to understand defense policy comprehensively, it is not sufficient 
merely to look at the execution of military strategies. We must analyze the inner dynamics of 
civil- military relations -- the relationship between defense policy and the domestic foundations 
of it.  
2. Statement of Problem : Why Congress and Defense Policy  
If this is the case, how can we analyze defense policy in the framework of civil-military 
relations? If we approach civil-military relations broadly, we can draw three major relationships 
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 Sun Tzu, Art of War.  Chapter I; Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Book I. This does not mean military strategies are 
not influenced by public or representatives of people. It means that the logic on which strategies are based are more 




between military and civilian authority depending on how we define either military or civilian 
authority (Huntington, 1961; Janowitz, 1973): First, the relationship between society as a whole 
and its military members; second, the relationship between political authority and military 
agency (Herspering, 2005); third, the relationship between the representatives of the public and 
military agency who is in charge of military affairs (Nielson, 2009). In the U.S., the first 
relationship can be visualized as the relations between the U.S. public and military as a whole; 
the second relationship could be the one between the President and the department of defense; 
the third relationship can be considered as the relationship between Congress and  military 
organizations, including the Department of Defense and subordinate military services.   
In the first relationship, the main issues have been how the public perceives their military 
and how public opinions affect defense policy and military strategies (Burnstein et.al., 1978; 
Hartley et.al., 1992; Groeling et.al., 2008) However, the effect of public opinion on defense is 
inclined to be indirect rather than direct, because there are various mechanisms that transmit 
public opinions to the military organizations (Burnstein et.al., 1978; Hartley et.al. 1992). 
Consequently, in order to understand the effect of public opinion on defense policy in detail, it is 
necessary to scrutinize these mechanisms that link the public to the military organizations.  
There are two main institutions that perform these mechanisms: the Presidency and 
Congress (Hays et.at., 1997). In the organizational aspect, the Presidency has executive power 
over all the military organizations; the President can appoint the high profile military officials 
such as the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moe, 1999). 
Moreover, considering the fact that the President is the commander - in - chief of all the military, 








However, the President- military is not the proper level of analysis for defense policy as a 
whole. Some other issues that are closely related to the public or constituents – such as military 
procurement, Military Base Realignment And Closure etc. – have been checked and affected by 
Congress (Deering et.al., 1989;Hays et.al.,1997). Moreover, even in strategic issues, Congress 
exercises authority by requesting executive branches to attend hearings and report the causes and 
consequences of related issues (Ripley et.al., 1992; Hartley et.al., 1992). Consequently, in order 
to understand the inner dynamics in the process of developing defense policy and civil-military 
relations, it is necessary to consider Congress as an influential actor in defense issues.  
 
3. Research Question 
The research topic of this thesis is the Congressional influence on defense policy. In 
order to analyze this topic theoretically, it is required to define the core concepts that are 
included in the title itself. There is a pair of major issues in the title – Congressional influences, 
and defense policy. 
In terms of Congressional influence, Congress has a number of means to influence 
policies of the Executive branches such as hearings, making a law, or performing some sort of 
means for governmental oversight (Shipan, 2007; McCubbins et.al., 1984). Among these, the 
most significant and prominent means of Congressional influence on policies of executive 
branches is voting behaviors of each legislator that determine the fate of legislation, and these 
behaviors define Congress’s fundamental role of making law for government (Krehbiel, 1998). 
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 Due to the professionalism in military affair, the President has a control over both strategic and structural issues in 
military affairs. But being compared to strategic issues, the structural issues are more inclined to be overseen by 




Defense policy also consists of various parts such as strategies which include threat 
analysis and tentative ways to deal with those threats, various programs to support and execute 
these strategies, procurement plan for supplying necessary equipment to do these tasks, and 
budgets for executing defense policy(Huntington, 1961, Hays et.al., 1997). Considering the fact 
that all items that are related to defense policy are included and described explicitly in the annual 
budgets of each year, it is possible to analyze defense policy by scrutinizing annual defense 
budgets, item by item. Moreover, due to the fact that most parts of defense policy such as 
strategy and technologies might be classified even to members of Congress, it can be said that 
defense budget is the only item on which Congress has clear influence (Deering et.al 1989; 
Lindsay et.al., 1992). 
Considering the fact that the focus of research is congressional influence on defense 
policy, the research question of this thesis is In the Congress, which factor will determine the 
result of a vote that is related to the defense budget?. In this thesis, in order to answer this 
question, votes on legislation that is related to the defense budget will be analyzed, and all of 
them are annual defense authorization and appropriation bills and related amendments. 
 
4. Plan of the Chapters 
In the following chapter, I describe how previous theories and research approached the 
voting behaviors of members of Congress on the defense budget bills. From the literature review, 
I draw some possible contributions that this thesis can make to the literature.   
In chapter III, I describe the data that I use and the methodology that I apply to analyze 
the data. I apply a logistic model for analyzing the data which covers annual defense budget 




In chapter IV and V, I analyze the result of the model, draw significant implications, and 





Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
The research topic of this thesis is congressional influence on defense policies. Before 
getting into the topic, it is required to investigate how previous studies have approached this 
topic. Congressional influence on defense policies has been studied with the following three 
perspectives: defense policy as a federal policy; Congress as a political institution; and Inter-
branch relations between the legislative branch and the executive branch. 
 
1. Defense Policy as a Federal Policy 
As I mentioned in the first chapter, defense policy deals with two fronts -- one for 
external threats, the other for its domestic foundations. Along these two fronts, scholars have 
divided defense policies into three categories: strategic policy, crisis policy and structural policy 
(Huntington, 1961).
3
 Strategic policy and crisis policy primarily deal with the external threats 
while structural policy deals with the domestic foundations (Ripley, 1980).  
According to Huntington, structural policy issues are related to personnel, organizations 
and equipment procurement (Huntington, 1961; Kaufman et.al., 1985; Hays et.al., 1997). 
Generally, Congress makes the final decision on each policy agenda of structural defense policy 
through the formal legislative process, even though policies are initiated by the Department of 
Defense and its services (Ripley, 1980). Previous studies focused on how Congress exercised its 
                                                 
2. The difference between strategic policy and crisis policy is unclear due to the fact that these two sub areas of 
defense policy deal with same aspect of defense policy (Huntington, 1961).  One possible way to distinguish one 
from the other is to focus on the phase each of them is related to. Strategic policy is more about to develop strategies 
on the basis of expectation on future contingency while crisis policy is about how to deal on-going crisis with 




budgetary authority over the defense budgets and the connections between budgets and 
constituencies. (Rundquist et.al, 1996; 1999; 2002; Thorpe, 2011)  
On the other hand, strategic policy pursues specific programs or deals with special 
situations. Those programs and situations are initiated by external threats such as changes of the 
international security environment (Huntington, 1961; Ripley, 1980, Hays et.al. 1997). 
Additionally, crisis policy is about how to deal with the crises which occur with unexpected time 
and space (Ripley, 1980; 1988). Scholars have focused on the presidential use of force in the 
event of international crisis (Baker, 2001; Hetherington, 2003; Groeloing, 2008). Most studies 
attempted to analyze the impact of presidential use of force on public opinion or the effect of 
changes in public opinion during the prolonged period of crisis on the following changes of 
military strategies, including use of force (Baker, 2001;Hetherington, 2003; Groeloing, 2008).  
Because strategic and crisis policies require the agencies, who have responsibility on 
policies, to react with professional skills and knowledge within a relatively short time, the 
president and the Department of Defense have the authority to initiate actions, even though 
Congress has the final decision power (Ripley, 1980). Considering the fact that these policy areas 
are classified for professional soldiers, these have been not the subjects of negotiation or 
bargaining in Congress but the one of explaining that is required to gain support from Congress 
(Huntington, 1961, Hays et.al. 1997). Congress also has been inclined to defer to the executive 
branch’s initiatives on military strategies in defense policy.  
 
On presidential and executive branches’ strong initiatives in strategic issues, Deering 
comments that it is difficult for Congress to influence the execution of defense policy, especially 




soldiers and their organizations (Deering et.al, 1989). As a consequence, he argues that the only 
areas in defense policy that Congress can assert its influence are budget related areas such as 
program authorization and budget authorization (Deering et.al, 1989).  
Hays et.al.(1997) argue that the influence of Congress has been increased in the defense 
policy decision making process because defense policy is related to the federal budget process. 
Referring to the fact that a budget can be effective after passing the process of authorization and 
appropriations, they argue that it is necessary to analyze how military-related actors, such as 
Congress, the Department of Defense, and each service, interact with Congress during the 
processes of authorization and appropriation (Hays et al., 1997). Some scholars attempted to 
analyze how public opinion influences the scale of the defense budget (Hartley et. al, 1992, 
Rundquist et.al.,1999; 2002). 
 
Rundquist and Carsey attempted to apply the distributive politics theory to defense 
spending, while arguing that it is problematic to understand defense spending as simply a public 
good for the national security (Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). They developed a model that 
includes party, committee, ideology, benefit to constituencies, and universalism as independent 
variables. Then, they applied it to defense spending from 1963 to 1995.  They concluded that 
defense spending can be accurately examined and predicted using distributive politics theories, 
and defense spending is a target area that most members of Congress desire to exert their 
influence on (Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). 
In addition to that, there are other studies that analyze how Congress affected certain 
defense procurement programs such as missile defense and SDI (Strategic Defense Initiatives) 




how each member of Congress votes for the specific programs and which facts determine their 
voting behaviors (Lindsay, 1990; Higgs, 1988; Twight, 1989).
4
 
 Some defense specialists attempted to analyze defense budgets in the aspect of 
connectedness with national economic status (Choshroy, 2011; Lindsay and Ripley, 1992). They 
found that the budget of RDT&E (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation) has been in 
hiding from detailed scrutiny largely because it is politically safe for members of Congress to 
support research, while defense procurement programs have been screened by public and 
Congressional scrutiny (Choshroy, 2011; Lindsay and Ripley, 1992).    
 
As the result of literature review on defense policy, I can conclude that the most 
significant area of defense policy that Congress can exercise its authority over is structural 
defense policy, specifically the defense budget. Moreover, it is necessary to analyze the budget 
items which include RDT&E as well as procurement programs by which legislators can benefit 
their constituencies. 
 
2. Congress as a Political Institution 
Institutionally, Congress has authority and power to approve the federal policies which 
are pursued by the executive branch. Considering the fact that defense policy is one of the 
federal policy areas and it is affected by congressional influence, it is necessary to understand 
how Congress makes decisions to use its authority. This issue has been studied and analyzed 
within the framework of the political institutions of American government (Deering et.at., 1997; 
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 In Congress and Defense Policy, Barry S. Rundquist et.al used Prime Contractor Award as measurement of 
defense budget in order to find the specific amount of budget that benefitted the certain states or district (Rundquist 




Poole and Rosenthal, 1991; Krehbiel, 1998; Rundquist and Carsey, 2002;  Cox and McCubbin, 
2005 ).  
The studies on Congress have approached Congressional decision making with three 
perspectives: committee based, party based and chamber based.  These three perspectives differ 
from each other depending on how principals in Congress control Congressional Committees 
(Deering et.al., 1997). Committee oriented perspective assumes that committees have sufficient 
autonomous authority to pursue their goal without significant interference from chambers or 
parties and each committee leads legislative affairs of its jurisdiction with strong initiatives by 
following  members’ preferences. The majority party oriented perspective assumes that 
committees are mere agents who just follow the directives or decisions from the majority party. 
The chamber oriented perspective assumes that committees are inclined to comply with what 
each chamber’s majority coalition wants, rather than do what the majority party wants when the 
majority party cohesion is weak.  
Distributive politics theory is one example of how these three perspectives can be applied 
into a specific area – Congressional budget process. Distributive politics theory offers the 
framework to understand how each legislator acts in Congress in order to give budgetary benefit 
to his constituency.  This theory is based on the assumption that legislators are inclined to 
“organize Congress and [then], create and implement policies so that they can better direct 
benefits to their constituencies, to get reelected” (Rundquist and Carsey, 2002).
5
 All three 
perspectives prove this assumption (Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). 
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 Rundquist and Carsey attempted to bring the distributive politics theory to defense policy.  By criticizing the 
previous literature that had considered defense policy as a policy area that is too important for distributive politics to 
affect, he argues that it is necessary to analyze defense policy – especially procurement programs — with 




In order to predict voting in Congress, Krehbiel developed a spatial theory on the basis of 
the assumption that the median voter has the pivotal power to determine whether a bill passes 
(Krehbiel, 1998). He assumes that each legislator has his own preference that can be converted 
into a position in a uni-dimensional policy space, and argues that it is possible to predict the 
possibility of a gridlock by finding the median voter and the position of a policy on the uni-
dimensional space (Krehbiel, 1998). After applying this theory to Congressional voting behavior, 
he suggests partisanship, ideology, constituencies and committee as possible significant factors 
that determine legislators’ preferences. (Krehbiel,1998).  
Cox and McCubbin examines the power of the majority party with the concept of agenda 
setting power (2005). They assumed that each committee has the authority to choose the 
positions of policy agendas on its jurisdictional policy area, and concluded that the majority 
party can exert the delegated agenda power by designating its party members to the influential 
offices of each committee (Cox and McCubbin, 2005).  
Poole and Rosenthal further developed median voter theorem into multi-dimensional 
spatial models. After analyzing the results of all roll call votes since 1789 using multi-
dimensional spatial models, they argued that, even though it is possible to use various 
dimensions, most roll call vote results can be explained by party loyalty and ideology. They 
considered the ideology as the primary factor that determines the voting behavior of each 
member of Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991). In addition to that, they further expected that 
if other specific dimensions are applied for short term predictions, it will be possible to explain 




According to the literature review on Congress as a political institution, it can be 
concluded that committee, party and majority coalitions in Congress are principle actors in 
Congress. Moreover, spatial theory suggests that vote results can be predicted mostly by 
ideology or party loyalty. But it is still unclear how these theories can be applied into 
Congressional budget process on a practical level.  
3. Federal Budget Process 
In the United States, in order for the federal government to pursue a certain program or 
policy, it is necessary to obtain Congressional approval on the federal budget.  The budget 
process consists of two different tasks - authorization and appropriation (OMB, 2008). 
Authorization means the process by which the executive branch obtains the authority from the 
Congress in order to pursue a certain program or policy (OMB, 2008). Through authorization, 
the executive branch can have an authority to include the approved programs in the annual 
budget proposal. Essentially, the authorization is centered on approving or disapproving a 
program and policy, rather than determining a certain budget for the program (OMD, 2008).  
The other task in the budget process is appropriation. Appropriation is the process to 
settle the annual budget – how much money will be spent for the programs and policies during a 
certain year (OMB, 2008). Appropriation is the task of each chamber’s Appropriation Committee 
and its subcommittees. Through the appropriation process, each agency and department obtains 
the authority to draw money for pursuing the programs and policies in the appropriation bill.  
 An annual budget process begins with the preparation of a presidential federal budget 
proposal (US Congress, 2007). When the proposal is completed, the White House sends this to 
the Congress. Once the presidential proposal arrives in the Congress, committees of both 




federal executive agencies (US Congress, 2007). After that, each committee releases an 
authorization bill and sends the bill to the Office of Congressional Budget for developing an 
annual budget resolution (US Congress, 2007).   
Under the guidance of an annual budget resolution, each chamber’s appropriation 
committee allocates the total budget to its subcommittees to review, modify, and amend budget 
ceilings and related programs (US Congress, 2007). After completing the subcommittee’s review 
and modification, each subcommittee sends the result to the appropriation committee. The 
appropriation committee finalizes the appropriation bill and sends it to the floor in order to 
consider amending the bill with all members of the chamber (US Congress, 2007). 
Studies on the federal budget process are dealing with two aspects: the institutional 
aspect that defines the budget processes and the process and its products (Deering et.al, 1997; 
Sinclair, 2005). Studies on the institutional aspect of the budget process focused on who has the 
initiative in the budget process and how to define the relationship between the three major actors: 
House Appropriation Committee, House Speaker and the President (Gordon, 2008).  
Moreover, most studies on the budget process and products closely connect to 
distributive politics. Crespin et.al attempted to analyze all floor roll call votes of the 100th -107th 
Congress appropriation bills and concluded that it is necessary to consider particular issue 
positions, rather than just focusing on ideological factors of liberal and conservative (Crespin et. 
al, 2010). This study confirms that the appropriation process can be analyzed with the viewpoint 
of distributive politics and suggests examining the Congressional budget process with a different 
framework.  
On the other hand, there are a few studies focusing on the interactions between the 




budget process (Sinclair, 2005; Gordon, 2008). Kernell et.al focuses on the interaction between 
specific agencies which are in charge of budget process -- OMB (the Office of Management and 
Budget) for the executive branch and CBO (the Congressional Budgetary Office)
6
 for the 
legislative branch (Kernell et.al, 1999).
7
  
So far, I have discussed federal budget process and how scholars have approached 
studying this process. The federal budget process is the process of determining the annual budget 
for the federal government, and executive and legislative branch interactions with each other to 
achieve their goals. Moreover, appropriations can be affected by institutional changes in the 
Congress and external situations. When scrutinizing the process rather than the results, we can 
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 Due to the fact that most studies on the budget process have been focused on the congressional phase -- especially 
on the appropriation process, the roles and influence of CBO have been overlooked. However, the very start of the 
congressional phase of budget process is the submission of the presidential budget proposal and CBO’s first 
evaluation on the presidential budget proposal; it is meaningful to examine how different the CBO’s first evaluation 
is from the presidential budget proposal. 
7
 Their studies are different from each other, depending on which indicators they chose among three estimates such 
as ‘early baseline estimates of both of the agencies’, ‘the president budget proposal and CBO’s evaluation on it’, and 
‘the final budget approved by Congress’. Arguing that it is necessary to be cautious on choosing indicators, Samuel 
Kernell  and Erik J Engstrom (Kernell et.al, 1999) analyzed the difference of budget estimates between OMB and 




4. Factors and hypotheses 
From the results of the literature review on related theories, I drew five possible factors 
that can explain the vote results on amendments to annual defense authorization and 
appropriation bills – partisanship (majority status), ideology, scale of budget items, and 
categories of budget items. 
8
 
According to the literature review, there are three significant factors that influence the 
decision making process in U.S. Congress: partisanship, ideology, and influence of committees. 
Among them, partisanship and ideology are factors that determine a vote of each legislator – yea 
or nay, while influence of committees is mostly related to the process (drafting stage) or the 
product of process (the bill). 
With the frameworks of partisanship and ideology, it is possible to predict each legislator 
choice on a roll call vote – yea or nay. If a legislator is compliant with his party, he might follow 
the choice of majority of his party members. On the other hand, if she mostly follows her 
ideology when voting in a roll call vote, she might choose the one which is ideologically closest 
between the related bill itself and an amendment to it. However, considering the fact that 
members of Congress vote for determining to pass or not to pass a legislative piece, it is not 
enough to predict each legislator’s vote only – it is the game of ‘passage’ or ‘failure’ in the level 
of a roll call vote on an amendment, while voting behavior is a choice between nay and yea in 
the level of individual legislators. In House of Representatives in U.S. Congress, the rule of the 
game is the simple majority which means getting 218 yea votes. Consequently, it can be 
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 I did not develop a hypothesis for categories on passage of amendments. I just examined the relationship between 




concluded that these three factors can influence the passage of an amendment by affecting the 
result of a roll call vote – the number of yea votes in a roll call vote on an amendment.    
1. Partisanship (Party politics) 
If political parties matter in the legislative process, each legislator is likely to vote in 
compliance with his party. In this case, the degree of party unity in the vote is high in either 
negative or positive direction for the amendment. Consequently, if a political party matters or if a 
political party has an influence on its members in U.S. Congress, the degree of the party unity is 
high. Moreover, there are two parties in U.S. Congress – currently Democratic Party and 
Republican Party. It means that it is possible for both parties to have high level of party unity and 
it is necessary to consider both parties’ party unity for analyzing the effect of partisanship. 
Considering the fact that most times in the history of U.S. Congress there have been only 
two parties, it is possible for me to call these two parties as the majority party which has seats 
more than 218 and the minority party which has the seats left. It is natural that, if the majority 
party has a high degree of party unity, the majority party can control the result of a roll call vote 
due to the fact that the majority party has more than simple majority seats. When the majority 
party determines to pass a piece of legislations, the members of the majority party are likely to 
act together in positive direction for an amendment. On the other hand, when the majority party 
determine not to pass a measure, the members of the majority party are likely to act together in 
the negative direction for an amendment. Moreover, considering the fact that the gap between 
majority and minority is not big enough, there is a possibility that the minority party can affect 
the result of a roll call votes even though the minority party cannot determine the result of a roll 




party can control the result of a roll call vote by acting together. Consequently, it can be said that 
the result of a roll call vote is determined partly by the minority party, even though the majority 
party has seats more than the simple majority (over 218 seats in House).  
 
Considering the fact that any legislator in House can suggest an amendment and the 
passage of an amendment is determined by either a roll call vote or voice vote in which all 
members of Congress participate in, it can be said that the amendment process is not controlled 
by the committee in charge. However, the committee has professional information on its 
jurisdiction and it can offer related legislative information to the parties. Moreover, it can further 
recommend or persuade to act into a certain direction. Assuming that the draft of a bill is the 
product of the committee and the committee has the professional influence on the jurisdiction of 
the bill, the committee is likely to act against amendments that possibly harm the original 
intention of the committee and recommend the majority party not to pass amendments.    
 
Hypothesis 1: As members of the majority party act together, an amendment is less likely 
to pass.   
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The minority party’s influence on passage of an amendment is conditional on the majority party’s party unity.  
1) Minority party unity can affect when majority party is on the same side. 
2) Minority party unity can affect when majority party is split. 





2. Vote based on Ideology  
Ideology is another significant factor that determines each legislator’s voting behavior. 
Institutionally, amendment process is the process in which legislators choose one of the two 
legislative pieces – a bill and its amendment.  When a legislator chooses one of them, he will 
choose the one that is more preferable to the other. If the ideology is the main factor that he 
consider when making decision, he will choose the one that is closer than the other in aspect of 
ideology. Consequently, it is possible to predict a legislator’s vote by analyzing the relative 
ideological preference between a bill and its amendment. It also means that the prediction of 
voting behavior of each legislator is the consequence of calculation about relative ideological 
distances from the legislator to two legislations – a bill and an amendment. 
Assuming that ideology is the most significant factors that determine the voting in 
Congress, the sponsor of a bill might consider the possibility of passage that is calculated on the 
basis of the ideology when raising an amendment.  If he intends to change a bill by passing the 
amendment, he might consider how many legislators are more satisfied with the ideological 
aspect of an amendment than that of the status quo bill. Assuming that legislators are inclined to 
keep their ideological position during their term in House, a sponsor can predict the probability 
of passage and he might raise an amendment that is expected to pass on the basis of his 
prediction. Consequently, more legislators vote with their ideological preference, the more 
accurate the vote prediction is. Moreover, the more accurate the vote prediction is, the more 
probable an amendment is to pass.  
 
Hypothesis 3: as prediction of vote via ideology is more accurate, an amendment is more 





3. Cost of Amendment 
Considering the fact that the authorization and appropriation process is dealing with 
federal budgets, amendments in these processes contains the adjustments of budget amounts. 
These adjustments can be called the cost of amendment because this is the change of budget 
caused by amendments. According to the committee based theory, a committee has professional 
information in its jurisdiction and legislators who are not members of the committee are inclined 
to rely on the committee’s information when they make decisions on issues that are related to the 
committee’s jurisdiction. 
Assuming that a bill is a product of a committee in a certain jurisdiction, the committee is 
likely to act negatively to amendments. Moreover, the larger the cost of amendment, the more 
the committee will be against to the amendment because a large cost of amendment means a 
large change of the original bill.  Consequently, as the cost of amendment increase, an 
amendment is less likely to pass. 












Chapter 3 Method and Data 
1. Scope and the Unit of analysis 
The period that this thesis covers is from 1993 to 2012 and, by administration, it covers 
from the first Clinton administration to the current (Obama) administration. . I analyzed both 
defense authorization bills and appropriations bills of this period in order to examine the 
influence of Congress on defense policy. The unit of analysis of this thesis is each amendment to 
the defense authorization bill and defense appropriations bill in each year during the given period. 
I found 227 amendments for authorization and 112 amendments for appropriation
10
.  
 This period can be defined with the concept of military transformation
11
. During the first 
Clinton administration, the literature of military transformation was formed. In the second term 
of President Clinton, this concept evolved into specific programs for realizing its vision. During 
Bush administration, the U.S. was in a war while the concept of military transformation was 
being pursued. There might be compromise between reality and vision during Bush 
administration. Now, Obama administration prepares another shift from ‘a state of war’ to ‘a 
period of peace and preparation’.  
I gathered the data for this thesis primarily from the Congressional record 
12
and roll call 
vote record
13
 gathered by the Library of Congress. I used the vote result of each roll call vote on 
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 I counted all roll call votes on amendments to annual defense authorization and appropriation bills. I did not 
include roll call votes on final passage of the bills. 
11
 This paragraph was written on the basis of basic knowledge on military transformation. The literature of military 
transformation is highly debatable and enormous in contents. It encompasses wide range of defense policy from 
organizational management, operational adjustment and developing high-technology. I just address the period of the 
military transformation because whole literature review on military transformation is beyond the boundaries of this 








every amendment, and analyzed the contents of each amendment for categorizing each 
amendment into proper budget categories. 
In addition to the actual data about roll call votes, I also consider the prediction of roll 
call votes as another subject to analyze. For this, I chose ideology as the primarily factor to 
predict votes of each legislator.  Poole and Rosenthal have collected all the record of roll call 
votes in the US Congress, and predicted legislators’ votes in accordance with various factors 
such as ideology, social justice, etc.  By comparing actual data and predictions, they have offered 
analysis on which factor determine votes of each legislator. For analyzing vote prediction, I used 
the result of vote predictions based on legislators’ ideology and each individual legislator’s vote 
record in each roll call vote. I gathered the data from the website of Poole and Rosenthal.14   
 
2. Dependent variables 
The primary dependent variable is the result of each roll call vote on an amendment to the 
defense authorization bills and appropriations bills of the given years. I considered the dependent 
variable as a dummy variable. The dependent variable can be measured in accordance with the 
result of a roll call vote – whether or not each amendment was passed. I coded the result as “1” if 
an amendment was passed and as “0” if an amendment was not passed in the House.
15
  
When I focus on the passage of an amendment, the number of failed amendments is twice 
as large as that of passed ones (passed: 121, failed: 206; see table 1). In authorization bills, the 
number of failed amendments is almost the same as that of passed ones (passed: 109, failed: 106; 
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 http://voteview.com/dwnominate.asp  
15
 For examining the effect of ‘accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology’ on passage of amendments, I 
determined to do a pilot test and consider as the dependent variable for the pilot test  ‘difference of vote result 
between estimation based on ideology and the actual vote result (pass or failure)’. If the estimated results are the 





see table 1). However, in appropriation bills, the failed amendments are five times larger than the 
passed ones (passed: 15, failed: 97; see table 1). I estimate that this difference between 
authorization bills and appropriation bills comes from the difference of attributes of two different 
budget processes – authorization and appropriations.  
<Table 1: Pass or Fail> 
Authorization & appropriation Authorization Appropriation 
Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail 
121 206 106 109 15 97 
N= 327 N=215 N=112 
 
2. Independent variables 
I considered four variables as the independent variables that explain the changes of the 
dependent variable.  
(1) Party status/ Party Unity 
One of the traditional factors that affect voting behavior of members of Congress has 
been party unity. When a party has a relatively strong influence on its members, they are likely 
to vote in accordance with the intent of their party leadership. In order to measure the party 
loyalty or party unity, I used Rice Cohesion Score. 
16
 which means the difference between Nay 
and Yea in one party (Carey, 2009). In addition to that, I considered the effect of party status, 
either majority or minority.   
             |
                       
                   
| 
Equation 1. RICE Cohesion Score17 
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 The title of RICE score came after the name of a scholar, Stuart Rice 
17
 I needed to describe the effect of Nay because the result of a roll call vote is either pass or non-pass. If majority 




                                             Source: Carey, 2009, p.94 
 
Another variable that reflects partisanship is the party membership of sponsors of 
amendments. I coded that ‘1’ for Democrat and ‘0’ for Republican. 
 
Party status 
During the period from 1993 to 2012, the Republican Party had the majority status except 
for the 103
rd 
Congress and the 111
th
 Congress. When checking the difference between the 
majority party and the minority party, there have been larger differences when the Democratic 
Party was the majority party.  
 
<Table 2: Majority and Minority> 
 103rd 104th 105th 106th 107th 108th 109th 110th 111th 112th 
Republican 176 230 228 223 221 229 232 233 178 242 
Democrat 258 204 206 211 211 205 201 202 256 193 
R-D -82 26 22 12 10 24 31 31 -78 49 
    Note: this table was produced on the basis of the beginning of each Congress; Bold & Italic means Majority status. 
    Source: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record 
 
 
Party unity (Rice No.) 
In authorization bills, most observations show high degree of party unity ( See the center 
graph of figure 1). It means that  most legislators were inclined to vote in compliance with their 
party. Moreover, when considering the fact that most observations are located in the top- left and 
the bottom-right part of the graph, it can be said that members of each party were likely to vote 
                                                                                                                                                             
how many Nays were in the roll call vote. Consequently, in addition to taking absolute value of Rice No., I 
consistently subtract the number of Nay from the number of Yea and took real value of calculation in order to 




in opposite direction to each other. In appropriation bills, most observations are located in the 
middle of graph — between -0.5 and 0.5 (see the right graph of figure 1). It means that most 
legislators were inclined to vote not in compliance with their party in appropriation bills.  
There are some amendments in which legislators of both parties voted in the same 
direction. (See both the center and the right graphs of figure 1. The observations in the top right 
part and bottom left party are amendments that both parties voted in the same direction18.) In 
these amendments, they voted favorably for the amendments to authorization bills while voted 
negatively for the amendment to appropriation bills (see the top right part and the bottom left 
part of each graph). Additionally, when each legislator did not vote in compliance with their 
parties, they were inclined to vote negatively for amendment to appropriations bills while they 
were inclined to vote positively for amendment to authorization bills (see the observations 
between ‘-.5’ and ‘.5’ of the both graphs) 
 
<Figure 1: Rice no. (Dem vs. Rep.)> 
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 The observations in the top right part of each graph means that both parties voted positively to an amendment 




(2) Ideology: Accuracy of Vote Prediction based on Ideology 
According to Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, the ideology of each member of 
Congress is the most influential factor that determines voting behaviors of members of Congress 
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1991). They argue that it is possible to predict the votes of each legislator 
with their ideological position (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991). If ideology is the most influential 
fact that that determines each legislator's votes, legislators might choose the ideologically 
preferable one between the status quo bill and an amendment to it. Moreover, assuming that 
choice between 'Yae' and 'Nay' are based on the relative distance from a legislator’s ideological 
position to both the status quo bill and an amendment, it is possible to locate the midpoint which 
is apart with same distance from both the status quo and an amendment. If a legislator is closer to 
an amendment than its midpoint, he might vote ‘Yae’ for the amendment. Otherwise - if a 
legislator more away from an amendment than its midpoint, she might vote ‘Nay’ for the 
amendment. Consequently, it is possible to estimate the passage of votes by counting the number 
of 'Yae'. 
Nonetheless, the unit of analysis of this thesis is not each member of Congress but each 
amendment to defense budget bills. While their theory is suitable for predicting individual votes 
made by each member of Congress, it is not proper to predict the passage of amendments. For 
example, there might be some roll call votes in which legislators do not vote in accordance with 
their ideology. Moreover, not voting with their ideology can change the actual result of roll call 
vote. In these cases, it is not proper to explain why the result changed and whether or not 
legislators vote ‘in accordance with ideology’ only with midpoints and their ideological positions.  
To answer these questions – why the result changed and whether or not legislators vote 




legislators vote in accordance with ideology. In order to properly reflect the effect of the 
ideology of each amendment on passage of amendments, I operationalized the effect of ideology 
as the percentage of votes not predicted by ideology – accuracy of vote prediction based on 
ideology.  The closer is the predicted result to the actual result, the more precisely does the vote 
result reflect the ideological aspect of each member of Congress. The variable was measured as 
the percentage of ‘total number of wrong predicted votes’ to ‘total number of votes’. By using 
this index, it is possible to measure how many legislators vote with their ideology and to 
examine the effect of voting with their ideology on the passage of amendments. 
The % of votes not predicted by ideology of each amendment was measured through five 
steps. First, I extracted each roll call vote’s ideology midpoint from Poole and Rosenthal’s data 
base and each legislator’s ideology position that was estimated by DW NOMINATE
19
 number. 
Second, I estimated the vote of each legislator by comparing his or her ideology position to the 
ideology midpoint of each roll call vote. Third, I compared the estimated result of each legislator 
and the actual one that the legislator voted. If the estimated and actual results are the same, I 
coded “1”. Otherwise, I coded “0”. Fourth, I counted the number of amendments that were coded 
as “0” and divided the result by the total number of House members. The product of this process 
is the % of votes not predicted by ideology.  








% of Votes not Predicted by 
Ideology (> 0.2) 132 88 44 
 






<Figure 2: % of votes not predicted by ideology> 
 
There are 132 amendments that have a larger difference than 20% (Table 2 & figure 3).  
Considering the fact that Poole and Rosenthal argued that 85% of voting behaviors have been 
explained by ideology of each legislator (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991), it can be said that their 
estimation does not fit the results of more than 40% of all observations in this research.  





<Figure 4: % of votes not predicted by Ideology and party unity in appropriation bills > 
 
 
(3) Budget Item of each Amendment  
As I already described, defense authorization bill and appropriation bill deal with the 
Federal budget— money. In most previous studies, procurement programs and its budget have 
been the focus (Lindsay, 1990; Higgs, 1988; Twight, 1989, Rundquist, 2002). The reason why 
procurement programs have been recognized as a core of interest is that this is the very area of 
budget that a member of Congress can make a difference for her political intent (Rundquist, 
2002). Moreover, other budget items such as the budget for maintenance and operation have not 
been under the influence of Congress due to the fact that the budget required to spend to 
maintain the military organizations for their basic mission.   
In addition to that, a recent study showed that some significant programs, such as Missile 
Defense System Program or Joint Strike Fighter Program, have been included in RDT&E
20
 
phase. The study also argues that some programs have stayed in the phase of RDT&E 
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intentionally to escape from intense budget screening along with the budget process. Considering 
this fact, it is necessary to scrutinize the budget items that are included in RDT&E phase.  
Moreover, due to the fact that this thesis is an analysis on amendments to annual defense 
authorization and appropriation bills, it is required to scrutinize the contents of the budget item 
and to examine the relationship between the contents of the budget item that are related to an 
amendment and the amendment itself.  
To measure this variable, I considered this variable as an categorical variable and I coded 
the contents of each amendment in accordance with budget categories that have been used in the 
defense budget request form; “1” for basic, applied, and advance technology in RDT&E phase “2” 
for system development, test and evaluation; “3” for procurement;  ; “4” for general operation 
and maintenance
21
 ; “5” for military constructions and BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure);  
“6” for general items that are related to whole budget.  
<Figure 5. Distribution of amendments by budget categories> 
 
Note: 1: basic, applied, advanced technology, 2: system development and evaluation, 3: procurement 
4: operations and maintenance, 5: military construction, 6: etc 
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 I included the budget item ‘Personnel’ in ‘Operations and Maintenance’, because  basically the budget for 




When I checked the category of budget items that each amendment dealt with, most of 
the amendments are included in the category of ‘Operation and Maintenance’ (Category IV). It 
was followed by ‘General items’ (Category VI) and others. In percentages, the appropriation 
bills have more amendments that were related to procurement and RDT&E than the 
authorization bills have. 
 
<Table 4. Categories> 






Category 1 21 8 13 
Category 2 23 17 6 
Category 3 23 12 11 
Category 4 197 135 62 
Category 5 9 7 2 
Category 6 54 36 18 
 
Note : 1: basic, applied, advanced technology, 2: system development and evaluation, 3: procurement 
4: operations and maintenance, 5: military construction, 6: etc 
 
 
(4) Cost of Amendments (Amount of budget change) 
Speaking of the amount of budget changes presented in amendments, there are 185 
amendments that did not contain the amount of budget changes (See table 5). Most of them are 
the amendments in authorization bills, and these amendments contained contents about the 
redefinitions of terms, special requests to the Department of Defense or the President, or changes 
of rules and regulations that were dealing with sensitive budget items
22
.  
When analyzing the standard deviations and the distributions of the budget changes, the 
amounts are so dispersed that it is meaningless to set the average amount and possible 
boundaries of the expected budget changes. 








<Table 5. Summary of amendments by amount of budget changes> 






Amount=0 185 159 26 
Min. 0 0 260 
Median 0 0 22,020 
Mean 725,400 197,000 1,738,000 
Max 35,200,000 12,000,000 35,200,000 
SD 3,411,390 940,904 5,558581 





Chapter 4 Data Analysis 
 
1. Examination of Models  
To examine how each independent variable affected the passage of an amendment, I 
develop logistic regression models. I considered two different models: one for the variables that 
are related to the traditional factors such as ideology, partisanship, and committee power; the 
other for the categories of budget items. (See table 6&7). According to the result, authorization 
process is more predictable than appropriation process. In authorization process, majority party 
unity, accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology and cost of amendment show statistical 
significances while, in appropriation process, only majority party unity shows a statistical 
significance of ‘0.1’.   
<Table 6: Result of Logistic Models: Authorization bills only> 
 Model1 Model 2 
 Prob. Pass. Prob. Pass. 
A. Majority Party unity 3.917 
(1.73×  
  )*** 
 
B. Minority Party Unity 1.027 
(0.1560) 
 
C. Accuracy of Vote 
Prediction based on 
ideology 
1.081 




D. Dollar amount -4.649×
     
(0.00311 ) ** 
 





















Obs. 227 227 










 Prob. Pass. Prob. Pass. 
A. Majority Party unity 2.175 
(0.0769) . 
 
B. Minority Party Unity 1.46 
(0.15362) 
 
C. Accuracy of Vote 





D. Dollar amount -9.666×
     
(0.39046) 
 





















Obs. 112 112 
                                         Note: *** >000, **>0.001, *>0.05 
 
2. Party Unity / Party Status 
Hypothesis 1: As members of the majority party act together, an amendment is less likely 
to pass.   
Hypothesis 2: As members of the minority party act together, an amendment is more 
likely to pass.  
Considering the theory of party politics, the most significant factor that can affect the 
passage of an amendment is whether the majority party unifies and how strong the majority party 
acts together. After finding each Congress’s majority party and calculating the Rice Cohesion 
Score of the majority party, I obtained a positive relationship between the majority party’s 




Minority party unity also shows positive effect on the probability of passage but the 
effect is not strong enough when compared to majority party unity. (see Figure 6).  I speculated 
that the effect of minority is conditional on the majority party unity. In addition to that, when the 
difference between majority party members and minority party members is not large enough, 
minority party can be more influential. In most cases, a majority party should be unified more 
than 85% for guaranteeing the passage of an amendment (See table 1.) 
Moreover, compared to authorization bills, appropriation bills have larger error 
boundaries. I speculated that this difference came from the relative low level of party unification 
in the positive direction in appropriation bills
23
 .Considering the fact that the minority party’s 
slope of curve in appropriation process is stiffer than that of authorization process, it can be 
concluded that minority party unity’s effect in appropriation process is stronger than that in 
authorization process (see bottom of figure 6).  
<Figure 6: Majority and Minority party unity(Rice no.) and probability of passage> 
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 It can be thought that this symptom was also caused by the relative fewer amendments in appropriation bills that 
were passed with the high level of majority party unification. There was only one amendment that was passed with 





Note: model = glm (result of roll call vote ~ majority party Rice no, family = binomial, model= ‘logit’)  
 
In addition to the majority party unity, I also considered the party membership of 
amendments’ sponsors as a control variable. When I developed a separate logistics model and 
examined it, I found no significant effect and no probabilistic significance between sponsors’ 
party membership and the probability of passage of an amendment (See figure 7; compare 
majority party “1” to minority party “0”). 
<Figure 7: Party membership of sponsors and probability of passage> 
 





3. Accuracy of Vote Prediction based on Ideology 
 
 
According to Poole and Rosenthal’s argument, more than 85% of all roll call votes have 
been explained by the legislators’ ideology. So, if ideology is the primary factor that influences 
the voting behaviors of each legislator, each legislator is likely to vote on the basis of his or her 
ideology, regardless of the possibility of passage of an amendment. However, as I mentioned 
before, roll call votes that were related to defense budget have not been voted for in accordance 
with each legislator’s ideology, in relation to the overall roll call votes cast based on ideology 
(See table.3 and Figure 2) 
In order to examine the explanatory power of ideology on predicting the result of roll call 
votes on amendments in annual defense authorization and appropriations process, I tested the 
effect of accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology on the passage of amendments with a 
logistic model in order to examine the effect of ‘accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology’ 
on probability of passage (See Figure 9). 
<Figure 9: % of votes not predicted by ideology and probability of passage> 
 




In authorization bills, amendments are less likely to pass as ‘accuracy of vote prediction 
based on ideology’ increases
24
, while the amendments in appropriation bills do not show a clear 
relationship between two variables. Moreover, the error boundaries also fluctuated significantly. 
I also speculated that ‘no clear relationship’ was caused by relatively narrow difference between 
nays and yeas of the results.  
In order to trace the origins of these relatively wide error boundaries, I attempted to 
divide both appropriation bills and authorization bills into the passed amendments and the failed 
amendments, and checked the distribution of % of votes not predicted by ideology along the 
number of Yeas (See figure 10 & 11). Additionally, I examined the relationship between number 
of yea and accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology.  
In cases of passed amendments to authorization bills, there is a clear linear relationship 
between the number of Yeas and ideological difference (Pr(>|t|)>0). Moreover, a large 
proportion of observations are located in both top right and bottom left, which generates a 
positive linear relationship. In the case of failed amendments, most observations are located in 
the top left and there is no clear linear relationship (Pr(>|t|)=0.226)  (See figure 10). 
<Figure 10:  % of votes not predicted by ideology of each Amendment in Authorization bills> 
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When legislators vote in accordance with their ideology, it is difficult to predict whether 
or not an amendment passes, due to the fact most amendments congregate within the space 
between 150 and 300 Yea votes. However, when legislators do not vote in accordance with their 
ideology, the amendments are more likely to pass with more than 400 Yea votes. 
 In cases of passed amendments to appropriation bills, most are widely dispersed along 
the X axis and they are located at the adjacency of the X axis. Only in cases of failed 
amendments is there a possible positive linear relationship with the coefficient of 92.70 
(Pr(>|t|)=0.101).   
<Figure 11: % of votes not predicted by ideology of each amendment in Appropriation bills>
 
4. Amount of budget : committee based theory  
According to the informative and distributive politics theories of Congress, each 
committee has access to valuable information related to its jurisdiction that the committee can 
use to exercise influence on the decision making process, by offering information that can work 
positively for committee members. In addition to that, legislators are inclined to make enormous 
efforts to get the committee membership that can be beneficial for their constituencies in order to 




H4. As the change of dollar amount by an amendment is larger, the amendment is less 
likely to be passed.  
As I described above, 50% of amendments to authorization bills passed and only 10% of 
amendments to appropriation bills passed. In cases of amendments to appropriation bills, the 
hypothesis 3-1 can be considered correct. When I examined both hypotheses with a logistic 
model, the result proved that amendments to authorization bills are less likely to pass, as the 
amount of budget increases. However, the model did not offer meaningful predictions for 
amendments to appropriation bills, since the error gap is too wide (See Figure 13). 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the committee influence is partly proven in 
amendments to defense budget related bills, and it is necessary to analyze the effect of budget 
amounts on each related program, especially in appropriation bills.  
 







According to the distributive politics theory of Congress, legislators attempt to bring as 
much benefit as possible to their constituencies. I estimated that there might be a relationship 
between categories and passage of amendments. In order to find possible relationships, I 
developed a logistic model and examined it.  
<Figure 13:  Categories of budget included in Amendments and probability of passage> 
 
In amendments to authorization bills, category I (Basic Research), IV (Operation and 
Maintenance), and VI (General Items) have relatively high levels of passage. But considering the 
confidence interval, only category IV can be considered as a significant one. In amendments to 
appropriation bills, category V (Military Construction) has a relatively high level of passage. 
Moreover, category IV is the one that can be considered significant when considering the 
confidence intervals. Figure 13 shows the difference between the authorization process and 
appropriation process in defense budget bills. In the authorization process, legislators are more 
lenient to pass an amendment that contains relatively small scale research programs that can 




passed because the process does not add items to annual budget plans, but adjusts the amount of 
money based on the budget ceiling. Category V in the appropriation process is the only one with 
high probability of passage, and the amendments in this category are about postponing or 
delaying the planed BRAC programs.  
Consequently, amendments are not the proper level of analysis of budget categories, 
except for the research which is focused on a specific budget category. A program or a legislator 
who comes from the districts that are benefitted by the program might be the proper unit of 
analysis. Moreover, the result supports that two different budget processes need to be analyzed 



















Chapter 5 Discussion and limits of analysis 
 
1. Summary and Interpretation of Findings 
 
According to the findings, majority party unity is the influential factors that determine the 
result of vote for amendments to defense budget bills – both authorization bills and appropriation 
bills. In the case of authorization bills, the major party unity has stable influence on vote results 
in the matter of statistical significance (<0.025), while they show relative wide error boundaries 
in appropriation bills. Consequently, it can be concluded that it is necessary to scrutinize the 
causes of error boundaries, especially in appropriations bills, even though majority party unity 
can explain most of the votes for amendments to the defense budget bill. 
In authorization bills, accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology also has a negative 
effect on passage of amendments. It means that House representatives are inclined to vote 
favorably for amendments in authorization process rather than vote in accordance with their 
ideologies. In appropriation process, this independent variable – accuracy of vote prediction 
based on ideology – does not show statistical significance.  
On the other hand, the amount of budget and categories of budget items do not show 
statistically significant effects on the passage of amendments, except for the effect of the amount 
of the budget on amendments to authorization bills. I speculated that this result was caused by 
the fact that most amendments in authorization bills does not deal with actual amounts but the 
concept and the purpose of the budget that defines the bills. Moreover, legislators made efforts to 
include a relatively small amount of budget, which is large enough for one district, in order to 




inclined to pass because they were not prominent in scale. However, even in authorization bills, 
the effect is not strong enough to determine the passage of amendments.  
Moreover, the authorization process and appropriation are quite different from each other, 
even though both of them are dealing with the Congressional budget. First, the amount of money 
is different. Amendments in appropriation bills deal with larger amounts of money compared to 
authorization. Second, Amendments in appropriation deal with the budget amount primarily, but 
those in authorization bills include some strategic issues, such as how to perceive China and how 
to define the programs and the purpose of it. Third, most amendments in appropriation bills are 
about reducing the budget or transferring the budget from one program to another, while those of 
authorizations also include increase of budgets.  
 
2. Suggestions for Future studies 
 
One of the limitations in this thesis is the fact that it did not reflect the connection 
between members of Congress and their constituencies sufficiently. Considering the fact that 
distributive politics theory offers the most valid explanation for behavior of members of 
Congress, it might be critical limitation.  
However, it is worth considering the fact that the focus of this thesis is not the drafting 
process but the amendment process. According to the distributive politics theory, a member of 
Congress is inclined to pursue the membership of the committee that is most closely related to 
her district or state.  The process that the membership of a committee has influence on is the 
drafting process of a bill. In this thesis, the membership of related committees, such as House 
Armed Service Committee, does not have a critical influence, because I analyzed the amendment 




Moreover I analyzed not the voting behavior of each member of Congress, but the results 
of the roll call vote for each amendment. In the amendment process, if the budget item is closely 
related to her district or state, the member of Congress will cast a vote with a consideration of the 
interest that her constituency has. However, the result of the roll call vote is not likely to be 
determined by one member of Congress and it is scarcely that one budget item has a critical 
impact national wide.    
Nonetheless, considering the fact that connection with constituency is a significant and 
influential factor in the drafting process and for estimating each member of Congress’s voting 
behavior, it is necessary to apply this factor for specific program analyses and studies on 
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Result of the Pilot Test (See p. 22)  
 
In order to examine the explanatory power of ideology, I compared the estimated passage 
of amendments to the actual results. The results were not the same in 34 amendments out of 327 
roll call votes. In order to explain the change of result (from pass to fail or from fail to pass), I 
determined to further examine the effect of accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology on the 
change of the result – from pass to fail or from fail to pass.  
When I examined this hypothesis with a logistic model, ‘Accuracy of vote prediction 
based on ideology’ did not make significant differences on the result in authorization bills. 
However, the result showed a possibility that ‘accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology’ 




right graph in Figure 8). The result shows that as legislators do not vote in accordance with their 
ideologies, the possibility of change of passage increase.      
<Figure 8:  ideology difference and probability of result change> 
 
Note: Ideology of amendment is the %of votes not predicted by ideology. “0” in Y axis means that the result was 
         changed and “1” means vice versa.  
 
Considering the fact that the error boundary is too wide in appropriation process, it can be 
concluded that the estimated passage of amendments is not guaranteed. I speculated that 
unpredictability of the result is caused by the fact that most amendments in appropriation bills, 
which have an % of votes not predicted by ideology over 0.3, were determined with narrow vote 
margins.25 This result also comes from the fact that ideology itself is not the factor that 
estimates the passage of amendments but the one that measures each legislator’s voting behavior.  
However, assuming that the rule that determines the passage of an amendment is the 
simple majority rule, it is possible that there are some cases where ‘not voting in accordance with 
ideology’ has made a difference in the number of Yea-Nay votes, even though it did not change 
                                                 
25
 See figure 11. There are 7 observations that have an ideology difference over 0.3, and 4 out of them were located 




the passage of an amendment. As a result, I determined to examine the effect of vote prediction 
on passage of amendment. 
 
